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IV. REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
Since the mid-1960's, tender offers4 " increasingly have been used
as a means of effecting corporate acquisitions.479 When compared with
the more traditional forms of acquiring corporate control, notably merg-
ers, purchases of assets, and proxy contests, 480 the tender offer's appeal
becomes apparent.48' The chief advantage of a tender offer is its cost.
478. Congress enacted the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968),
amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1970)), to regulate tender offers, but did not define the term in the Act. It has
been suggested that this omission
apparently derives from the fact that the Congress and the Commission were
of the view that a tender offer for purposes of the federal regulatory scheme
may well encompass transactions yet unborn which are not considered tender
offers in general custom and usage. Thus the question of just what is encom-
passed by the term tender offer has been intentionally left open, in an osten-
sible effort to preserve the flexibility of both the Commission and the courts
in making a determination on a case-by-case basis.
E. ARANow & H. EiNHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as AatNow & EnHoRNI]. Aranow and Einhorn give the following
definition of a tender offer:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons
to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes
of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified
terms for cash and/or securities.
Id.
479. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARv. Bus. Rv., Mar.-
Apr. 1967, at 137 (study of 83 contested cash tender offers from 1956-1966). See
also D. AUsTIN & J. FIsnMm, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT-THE TENDER OFFER (1970)
(analyzing 191 cash offers and 41 exchange offers involving New York Stock Exchange-
listed companies from 1956-1966 and all tender offers for which data were available for
1967). A Wall Street Journal article announcing an SEC investigation into the ade-
quacy of its regulation of tender offers cited the following statistics: "In the 12 months
ended in June [1974], 105 tender offers were filed with the SEC, including 25 on be-
half of foreign bidders, up from 75 the year before, when eight were on behalf of for-
eigners." Wall Street J., Sept. 10, 1974, at 3, col. 3.
480. See Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
628 (1%5); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1 (1956);
Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Riv. 725 (1956).
481. There are three kinds of tender offers:
(I) the cash tender offer, i.e., a cash-for-stock exchange;
(2) the exchange tender offer, i.e., stock of the tender offeror exchanged for
stock of the target corporation; and
(3) the combination cash and exchange tender offer.
See note 478 supra. See also SEC rule 10b-13(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(b) (1974)
(defining exchange tender offers). The use of exchange offers is discouraged by the
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The expense of achieving a takeover by means of a tender offer is es-
sentially limited to paying a price for the shares of the target corpora-
tion sufficiently above the market price to attract tenderors.482 The ten-
der offer procedure also eliminates the often complicated and time-con-
suming preliminary negotiations which accompany both mergers and
sales of assets, and it obviates the need for the acquiring corporation
to obtain the acquiescence of the incumbent management and share-
holder ratification of the transaction. 4s3  Moreover, in a merger or a
sale of assets, the acquiring company pays for all or most of the assets
of the acquired company, whereas a tender offeror pays for only that
portion of a company's outstanding shares needed to gain control,484
and retains the option of merging with the acquired corporation at a
later date.48 5 Proxy contests are not as satisfactory a tactic for acquir-
ing corporate control as tender offers because they are expensive and
not always successful.48 6
Certain characteristics have been isolated as means of identifying
corporations especially vulnerable to takeover by tender offer.48 7 The
first of these characteristics is the price/earnings ratio of the target
company; the lower this figure, the greater the possibility is that the
registration and prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act. See generally ARANow & EIN-
HoRN 46.
482. The following is an example of a cash tender offer, subsequently leading to
substantial litigation:
Offer to Purchase Common Stock and 5% Convertible Subordinated Deben-
tures of Electronic Specialty Co. by International Controls Corp. at $39 per
share and $1,236 per $1,000 Debenture net (without brokerage charge and free
from transfer taxes) to the Seller.
Wall Street J., Aug. 26, 1968, at 17. See text accompanying notes 552-60 & 575-78
infra. Other tender invitations made in connection with the same transaction can
be found in Wall Street J., Aug. 19, 1968, at 15, and N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1968, at 67
(announcing an extension of the quoted tender offer).
483. See sources cited note 480 supra.
484. See ARANow & EnmoRN 65-66; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition
by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 318-19 (1967). See also Hayes & Taussig,
supra note 479; Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW.
115 (1967).
485. See Fleischer & Mudheim, supra note 484, at 318; Sehmults & Kelly, supra
note 484.
486. See Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27
Bus. LAw. 415 (1972); Young,'Judicial Enforcement of the Williams Amendments, 27
Bus. LAw. 391, 392 n.3 (1972).
487. See AnANow & EINHoRN 1-9. See generally Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 486;
Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw. 611 (1968); Fleischer & Mund-
heim, supra note 484; Hayes & Taussig, supra note 479; Young, supra note 486.
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offeror will realize a return on its investment. A second element is
the target company's low or declining earnings when compared with its
competitors. When this situation exists, an offeror can be expected
to argue that the target's poor performance has been due to the inepti-
tude of incumbent management. Thirdly, a corporation with liquid as-
sets substantially in excess of amounts needed for operating expenses
is particularly attractive, since such surplus liquidity can be used to
cover the costs of the tender offer if the successful offeror subsequently
merges with the target company.488 Fourthly, since tender offers re-
quire the solicitation of individual shareholders, corporations with con-
centrated share ownership are desirable targets due to reduced solicita-
tion expenses. The fifth major factor indicating susceptibility is the
total assets of the proposed target. Smaller corporations are more
vulnerable, since there is an increased likelihood of antitrust problems
when two larger corporations are involved.4 89
488. For a case holding a tender offeror liable to a non-tendering plaintiff for fail-
ure to disclose post-tender offer merger plans, see Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). This factor
makes a takeover by means of a tender offer especially attractive because it enables a
corporation with limited liquidity to acquire a target with greater liquidity.
489. One tender offer that caused considerable controversy in Congress was Mobil
Oil Corporation's offer for the common and preferred shares of Marcor, Inc. The chief
element of congressional criticism, leading to a Justice Department investigation of the
transaction, was the alleged violation of antitrust laws. Mobil was a major gasoline re-
tailer and Marcor's major enterprise was Montgomery Ward & Co., a retail chain which
includes some 600 auto-service centers. On September 10, 1974, Mobil announced it
would accept, on a pro-rata basis, 51.86% of the tendered shares, conditional on Mar-
cor's disposing of its controlling interest in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago be-
fore October 11, 1974. Wall Street J., Sept. 10, 1974, at 3, col. 2. For a discussion of
the acceptance of tendered shares on a pro-rata basis, see notes 509-10 infra and accom-
panying text.
Aranow and Einhom list additional characteristics indicating susceptibility to a tender
offer:
(1) Nominal stock ownership by management in comparison with the total
outstanding shares and trading volume;
(2) Substantial cash flow from depreciation;
(3) Undervalued fixed assets;
(4) Nominal debt and contingent liability;
(5) Poor shareholder and professional investment community relations;
(6) Cumulative voting where all directors come up for reelection at the same
time;
(7) Unwillingness to consider merger proposals;
(8) Declining dividends;
(9) Poor market performance of the targets stock;
(10) Absence of strong leadership in management; and
(11) Absence of extensive federal or state regulation of the target's business.
ARw'ow & Emlom 9.Washington University Open Scholarship
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Against this background Congress passed the Williams Act in
1968.4 90 Congress recognized that judicial interpretations had
rendered rule lOb-5 491 an inadequate remedy in the burgeoning area
of tender offers. 492  The language of section 14(e)493 of the Williams
Act, however, is patterned after the antifraud concept contained in sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5494 and reaffirms the full-
490. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970)).
491. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
492. When Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey initially proposed the legis-
lation in October 1965, see S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), his purpose was to
protect the incumbent management of "proud old companies" from "industrial sabotage."
See 111 CoNG. REc. 28, 256-60 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams). From this early
and, for federal securities laws, unique emphasis on protecting issuers, the objective
turned to closing a "gap" in the securities laws for the benefit of investors. While new
issues and proxy solicitations were governed by substantial disclosure requirements and
exchange tender offers were included under the 1933 Act provisions, cash tender offers
were relatively unregulated. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510, Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). See generally .AgNow & ENHoam 64-69; Brown, The Scope of the Williams
Act and its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAw. 1627 (1971); Fleischer & Mundheim,
supra note 484; Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing
Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 Howmnn L.J. 654
(1971); Hamilton, Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269
(1969); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1973); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83
H .L, REV. 377 (1969). See also 6 L. Loss, SEcunmus REGULATioN 3658-69 (2d
ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. Early litigation growing out of con-
tested tender offers demonstrated the inadequacy of reliance on the section 10(b) anti-
fraud provision and its implementing SEC rule 10b-5 largely as a result of the pur-
chaser-seller requirement enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Birnbaum cited the "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" language of rule lob-5 and limited its appli-
cation to defrauded purchasers or sellers. Despite what appeared to be the continuing
erosion of the Birnbaum doctrine, a defeated tender offeror was held to lack standing
because it could not meet the Birnbaum purchaser-seller criterion. Iroquois Indus., Inc.
v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909
(1970). Recently, the Birnbaum doctrine was reaffirmed in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975). Section 14(e), the antifraud provision of
the Williams Act, was phrased to cover fraudulent conduct "in connection with any
tender offer ...or solicitation ... in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,"
instead of using the SEC rule lob-5 "in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security" language.
493. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
494. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). Professor Loss points out the apparently inad-
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disclosure policy underlying the entire 1934 Act. Section 14(e) pro-
vides a remedy when there has been fraudulent conduct "in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solici-
tation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer, request, or invitation."'495 The disclosure rules for the enforce-
ment of the prohibitions enumerated in section 14(e) are found in two
other provisions of the Williams Act, sections 13(d)496 and 14(d),497
vertent omission of the traditional interstate commerce language in section 14(e) and
cautions counsel to include such allegations in their pleadings to preclude jurisdictional
problems. 6 Loss 3661.
495. It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes
of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
496. (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial
ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to sec-
tion 781 of this title, or any equity security of an insurance company which
would have been required to be so registered except for the exemption con-
tained in section 781(g) (2) (G) of this title, or any equity security issued by
a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per
centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to the
issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified
mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the
Commission, a statement containing such of the following information, and
such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors-
(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf
the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to
be used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or pro-
posed purchase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other
consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, or trading such security, a description of the transaction and the
names of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan
made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as defined in section 78c(a)
(6) of this title, if the person filing such statement so requests, the name of
the bank shall not be made available to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or
merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its busi-
ness or corporate structure;Washington University Open Scholarship
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authorizing and requiring the filing of a report, now known as Schedule
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned,
and the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly
or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person,
giving the name and address of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited
to transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements,
puts or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of prof-
its, division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, nam-
ing the persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings
have been entered into, and giving the details thereof.
(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statements
to the issuer and the exchange, and in the statement filed with the Commis-
sion, an amendment shall be transmitted to the issuer and the exchange and
shall be filed with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership,
syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing
of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person"
for the purposes of this subsection.
(4) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any percentage of a
class of any security, such class shall be deemed to consist of the amount of
the outstanding securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of such
class held by or for the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer.
(5) The Commission, by rule or regulation or by order, may permit any per-
son to file in lieu of the statement required by paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion or the rules and regulations thereunder, a notice stating the name of such
person, the number of shares of any equity securities subject to paragraph (1)
which are owned by him, the date of their acquisition and such other informa-
tion as the Commission may specify, if it appears to the Commission that such
securities were acquired by such person in the ordinary course of his business
and were not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the effect of chang-
ing or influencing the control of the issuer nor in connection with or as a
participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect.
(6) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-
(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or proposed to be
made by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933;
(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which, together
with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class
during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that
class;
(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of such security;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the Com-
mission, by rules or regulations or by order shall exempt from the provisions
of this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the
effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not
comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
497. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970) provides in part:
(I) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the
mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any fa-
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13D.498 Section 13(d) becomes operative after five percent499 of any
class of registered securities is acquired by any person, while section
14(d) governs a proposed five percent 00 acquisition of such shares.
Moreover, pursuant to section 14(d) (4) 01 and its corresponding rule,P02
cility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender offer
for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security
which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or any equity security
of an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered
except for the exemption contained in section 781(g)(2)(G) of this title, or
any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation thereof, such
person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5
per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or
invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders such person
has filed with the Commission a statement containing such of the information
specified in section 78m(d) of this title, and such additional information as
the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. All requests or
invitations for tenders or advertisements making a tender offer or requesting
or inviting tenders of such a security shall be filed as a part of such statement
and shall contain such of the information contained in such statement as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe. Copies of any additional
material soliciting or requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial so-
licitation or request shall contain such information as the Commission may by
rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors, and shall be filed with the Commission not
later than the time copies of such material are first published or sent or given
to security holders. Copies of all statements, in the form in which such mate-
rial is furnished to security holders and the Commission, shall be sent to the
issuer not later than the date such material is first published or sent or given
to any security holders.
498. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974). Schedule 13D calls for a detailed description
of the offer and offeror. Among the required items of disclosure are (1) the identity
and background of the offeror including its principal place of business and data concern-
ing its officers and directors, (2) the consideration to be paid for the securities and the
sources of funds so paid, (3) the purpose of the transaction and any plans that the
offeror will initiate if successful, and (4) data concerning any interest in the issuer al-
ready held or controlled by the offeror.
499. The SEC has proposed that the cutoff figure be lowered to 1%. Wall Street
J., Sept. 10, 1974, at 3, col. 3.
500. The SEC has proposed that this cutoff figure as well be lowered to 1%. Id.
501. Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to ac-
cept or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made
in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (4) (1970).
502. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1974) provides in part:
Filing of Schedule 14D.
(a) No solicitation or recommendation to the holders of a security to accept
or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders subject to section
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a Schedule 14D510 must be filed by persons making solicitations or rec-
ommendations regarding a particular tender offer."°4 Additional investor
14(d) of the Act shall be made unless, at the time copies of the solicitation
or recommendation are first published or sent or given to holders of the secu-
rity, the person making such solicitation or recommendation has filed with the
Commission a statement containing the information specified by schedule
14D: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to (1) a person re-
quired by § 240.14d-l(a) to file a statement, or (2) a person, other than the
issuer or the management of the issuer, who makes no written solicitations or
recommendations other than solicitations or recommendations copies of which
have been filed with the Commission pursuant to this section or § 240.14d-1:
And, provided further, That any person making a solicitation or recommenda-
tion to the holders of a security to accept or reject a tender offer or request
or invitation for tenders which solicitation or recommendation commenced
prior to July 30, 1968 shall, if such solicitation or recommendation continues
after such date, file the statement required by this section on or before August
12, 1968.
503. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1974). Schedule 14D requires a detailed description
of anyone making a recommendation with regard to a tender offer. Among the required
items of disclosure are (1) the identity of the securities, issuer, and tender offer in-
volved, (2) the identity of the person making the recommendations and his relation to
the issuer or offeror, and (3) copies of all recommendations and solicitations which will
be used.
504. Pursuant to SEC rule 14d-2, the Schedule 14D filing provision, inter alia, does
not cover brokers and dealers who merely transmit copies of solicitations or recommenda-
tions on behalf of an offeror:
Certain communications to which rules do not apply.
'The sections contained in this regulation (§ 240.14d-1 et seq.) do not apply
to the following communications:
(a) Offers to purchase securities made in connection with a distribution of
securities permitted by §§ 240.10b-6, 240.10b-7, and 240.10b-8.
(b) The call or redemption of any security in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the governing instruments.
(c) Offers to purchase securities evidenced by a script certificate, order form
or similar document which represents a fractional interest in a share of stock
or similar security.
'(d) Offers to purchase securities pursuant to a statutory procedure for the
purchase of dissenting shareholders' securities.
(e) The furnishing of information and advice regarding a tender offer to
customers or clients by attorneys, banks, brokers, fiduciaries or investment ad-
visers, who are not otherwise participating in the tender offer or solicitation,
on the unsolicited request of a person or pursuant to a general contract for ad-
vice to the person to whom the information or advice is given.
(f) A. communication from an issuer to its security holders which does no
more than (1) identify a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders made
by another person, (2) state that the management of the issuer is studying the
matter and will, on or before a specified date (which shall be not later than
10 days prior to the date specified in the offer, request or invitation, as the
last date on which tenders will be accepted, or such shorter period as the Com-
mission may authorize) advise security holders as to the management's recom-
mendation to accept or reject the offer, request or invitation, and (3) request
security holders to defer making a determination as to whether or not they
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protection is made available by the Williams Act through the disclosure
demands placed on issuers by sections 13 (e) and 14(f). Section 13 (e) 5 05
imposes specific disclosure requirements on issuers purchasing their
own securities while an outside tender offer is pending. Section
14(f)50 6 applies in a situation where the incumbent management of
the target approves and facilitates the takeover and, therefore, arranges
should accept or reject the offer, request or invitation until they have received
the management's recommendation with respect thereto.
(g) Offers to purchase securities in transactions exempt from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933 pursuant to section 3 (a)(10) thereof.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1974).
505. (1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of equity securi-
ties registered pursuant to section 781 of this tifle, or which is a closed-end in-
vestment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, to
purchase any equity security issued by it if such purchase is in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices which
are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent such acts and practices. Such rules and regulations
may require such issuer to pro-vide holders of equity securities of such class
with such information relating to the reasons for such purchase, the source of
funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price to be paid for such secu-
rities, the method of purchase, and such additional information, as the Com-
mission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors, or which the Commission deems to be material to a determi-
nation whether such security should be sold.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, a purchase by or for the issuer or
any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the issuer,
or a purchase subject to control of the issuer or any such person, shall be
deemed to be a purchase by the issuer. The Commission shall have power to
make rules and regulations implementing this paragraph in the public interest
and for the protection of investors, including exemptive rules and regulations
covering situations in which the Commission deems it unnecessary or inappro-
priate that a purchase of the type described in this paragraph shall be deemed
to be a purchase by the issuer for purposes of some or all of the provisions
of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970).
506. If, pursuant to any arrangement or understanding with the person or per-
sons acquiring securities in a transaction subject to subsection (d) of this sec-
tion or subsection (d) of section 78m of this title, any persons are to be elected
or designated as directors, of the issuer otherwise than at a meeting of security
holders, and the persons so elected or designated will constitute a majority of
the directors of the issuer, then, prior to the time any such person takes office
as a director, and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commission, the issuer shall file with the Commission, and transmit to all
holders of record of securities of the issuer who would be entitled to vote at
a meeting for election of directors, information substantially equivalent to the
information which would be required by subsection (a) or (c) of this section
to be transmitted if such person or persons were nominees for election as di-
rectors at a meeting of such security holders.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1970).
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for a majority of the positions on the board of directors to be turned
over to the offeror's nominees. An issuer is required to notify its
shareholders that such a transfer is imminent.5 0 7
The Williams Act also regulates the mechanics of a cash tender invi-
tation. The tender invitation or announcement is the basic soliciting
mechanism and generally contains the following information: (1)
the basic terms of the offer; (2) the method for the delivery of ten-
dered shares; and (3) the information required by rule 14d-1 (c).508
Certain terms and conditions are basic to all tender offers. The most
obvious is the offering price for each class of securities sought to be
acquired. A second term is the number of shares the offeror will pur-
chase. Section 14(d)(6) governs the situation in which the offeror
intends to purchase less than all of the target corporation's outstand-
ing shares and requires pro-rata purchases from all tendering share-
holders.0o Thus it is customary for a tender invitation to include one
of the following conditions on the number of shares the offeror intends
to purchase:
1. The offeror will purchase all shares tendered; or
2. The offeror will purchase a specified number of shares if at least
that number of shares is tendered. If the shares tendered do not
equal the number of shares the offeror seeks to purchase, the offeror
will invariably reserve the right to purchase all, a part, or none of
the shares tendered. Similarly, where the shares tendered exceed the
number of shares the offeror seeks to purchase, the offeror may pur-
chase all, a part, or none of such excess shares; or
507. Presumably, this notification would enable alerted shareholders to seek injunc-
tive relief prior to the actual changeover in the composition of the board of directors.
See Ratner, Section 14(f): A New Approach to Transfers of Corporate Control, 54
CORNELL L. REv. 65 (1968).
508. ARAwow & EmoRN 46.
509. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (1970):
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders,
for less than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater
number of securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten days after copies
of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to secu-
rity holders than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the
securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata, disregarding
fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each depositor.
The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to securities deposited within
ten days after notice of an increase in the consideration offered to security
holders, as described in paragraph (7), is first published or sent or given to
security holders.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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3. The offeror will purchase any and all shares tendered up to a spe-
cified maximum number of shares. If the shares tendered exceed
the maximum number of shares the offeror commits itself to pur-
chase, the offeror will reserve the right to purchase all, a part, or
none of such excess shares.510
Pursuant to rule 14d-1(c), there must also be provision for the re-
turn of shares not purchased when the benefits of the pro-rata rule are
invoked, as well as a statement of the date and time of the tender of-
fer's expiration. Additionally, there must be compliance with the with-
drawal privileges for a tendering shareholder pursuant to section 14(d)
(5).511
In the six years since the passage of the Williams Act, the courts have
had frequent opportunity to interpret its language in practical situations.
Whether the case law has effectuated the stated goal of this regulatory
510. AwtNow & ElmuoR, 48-49.
511. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970):
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until
the expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or re-
quest or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders, and
at any time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request
or invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regu-
lations, or order as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
The purpose of this provision was stated thus:
This subsection would give shareholders who tender their shares immediately
after the offer is made a short period within which to reconsider. At the other
end of the spectrum it would prevent tendered securities from being tied up
indefinitely awaiting a decision by the person making the offer as to whether
or not he will purchase them.
H.R. Rm,. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968). Other information frequently in-
cluded in tender invitations is discussed in AxANow & EIrNHoRN 52-60. All these re-
quirements are mandated by SEC rule 14d-l(c), promulgated under the rule-making
authority given to the SEC under section 14(d) (1). Rule 14d-1 (C) states:
All tenders offers for, or requests or invitations for tenders of, securities pub-
lished or sent or given to the holders of such securities shall include the follow-
ing information:
(I) The name of the person making the tender offer, request or invitation;
(2) The exact dates prior to which, and after which, security holders who
deposit their securities will have the right to withdraw their securities pursuant
to section 14(d) (5) of the Act, or otherwise;
(3) If the tender offer or request or invitation for tenders is for less than
all of the outstanding securities of the class and the person making the offer,
request or invitation is not obligated to purchase all of the securities tendered,
the date of expiration of the period during which the securities will be taken
up pro rata pursuant to section 14(d)(6) [of the Act], or otherwise; and
(4) The information required by Items 2(a), (c), and (e), 3, 4, 5, and 6
of Schedule 13D, or a fair and adequate summary thereof.
17 C.F.1L § 240.14d-l(c) (1974).Washington University Open Scholarship
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scheme, that is, to close a "gap" in the federal securities laws' 12 by re-
quiring full disclosure in connection with tender offers will now be
explored.
A. Persons Covered by the Protections of the Williams Act
The most difficult initial problem facing a prospective offeror is de-
termining when, by whom, and under what circumstances a Schedule
13D must be filed.5 13 In Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot 14 several di-
rectors of Bath Industries agreed to pool their voting power and acquire
additional shares in Bath in order to effect changes in the composition
of the board of directors and its policy. The aggregate amount of stock
owned by these directors exceeded ten percent of the outstanding stock
of Bath;515 thus, the issue was whether the formation of the group trig-
gered the filing requirements of section 13(d). In holding that a
Schedule 13D must be filed, the federal district court in Bath Industries
reasoned that by deciding to act together to obtain control, the directors
became a "group" and thus constituted a "person" within the meaning
of section 13(d)(3). Although the court was unable to determine pre-
cisely when the group was created, it required the Schedule 13D to
be filed within ten days of the group's "formation."5 16  In affirming,
the Seventh Circuit purported to rely on the legislative history of section
13(d)(3) and held that a Schedule 13D must be filed "when, but only
when, any group of stockholders owning more than 10% of the out-
standing shares of the corporation agree to act in concert to acquire
additional shares.151 7  To avoid the necessity of determining at what
512. See note 492 supra. See generally Binder, The Securities Law of Contested
Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569 (1973); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act:
Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 991 (1973).
513. See notes 496-500 supra.
514. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), affg 305 F. Supp. 526 (ED. Wis. 1969).
515. See notes 496, 498-99 supra.
516. 305 F. Supp. at 537-38.
517. 427 F.2d at 109 (emphasis original). Nonetheless, in using an "additional
share" test, the court was going beyond the standard stated in the section of the legis-
lative history cited, i.e. an agreement to act in concert. The legislative history indicates:
[Section 13(d)(3)] would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their
voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading the provi-
sions of the statute because no one individual owns more than 10 percent of
the securities. The group would 'be deemed to have become the beneficial
owner, directly or indirectly, of more than 10 percent of a class of securities
at the time they agreed to act in concert. Consequently, the group would be
required to file the information called for in section 13(d) (1) within 10 days
after they agree to act together, whether or not any member of the group hadhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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point the Bath group was actually formed, the appellate court posited
a rebuttable presumption based on the objective conduct of participants
in the group:
[O]nce it is shown that such a group has agreed to pursue a common
objective, and once it is further shown that a member of the group has
thereafter purchased additional shares of the corporation's stock, then
a rebuttable presumption arises that such purchase was made pursuant
to an agreement of the group as of that date to acquire shares in further-
ance of its objectives. 518
Moreover, the court further limited the triggering mechanism of the
Schedule 13D filing requirement by suggesting that section 13(d)(6)
(B)519 exempted purchases of additional shares of the same class not
exceeding two percent for the twelve-month period prior to the acquisi-
tion.5 20
This exemption for additional acquisitions of less than two percent
per year was the basis of the decision in Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox. 2'
Cox -was a non-profit medical center which received a bequest of more
than ten percent of Ozark's stock. Pursuant to a written agreement,
Cox's board of directors decided to join with other Ozark shareholders
to vote their holdings in an attempt to gain control of Ozark.
In denying a temporary restraining order sought by the airline on the
ground that the group failed to file a Schedule 13D, the federal district
court held, inter alia, that the mere formation of a group that owns
more than a ten percent interest and intends to seek control does not
trigger the Schedule 13D filing requirements "absent further acquisi-:
tions11522 in excess of two percent per year.
Other courts have refused to follow the restrictive interpretations
of Bath Industries and Cox. For example, in GAF Corp. iv. Mi-
acquired any securities at that time. This provision is designed to obtain full
disclosure of the identity of any person or group obtaining the benefits of own-
ership of securities by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship,
agreement or other arrangement.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1967). See also Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 70 (D.N.J.
1974) (coming together to hold or dispose securities also sufficient).
518. 427 F.2d at 110 (emphasis original).
519. See text quoted note 496 supra.
520. 427 F.2d at 111 n.7.
521. 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
522. Id. at 118 (emphasis original). Contra, Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (acqui-
sition by inheritance of 31% interest necessitates the filing of Schedule 13D).
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stein523 the Second Circuit held that four related shareholders who had
combined holdings of over ten percent of outstanding stock and intend-
ed to fight the incumbent management had to register under section
13(d). In finding that the mere formation of a group, regardless of
further acquisitions, would trigger the filing requirements, the court
reasoned that
[t]he history and language of section 13(d) make it clear that the stat-
ute was primarily concerned with disclosure of potential changes in con-
trol resulting from new aggregations of stockholdings and was not in-
tended to be restricted to only individual stockholders who made future
purchases and whose actions were, therefore, more apparent. . . . It
hardly can be questioned that a group holding sufficient shares can ef-
fect a takeover without purchasing a single additional share of stock . 24
In Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co. 2 5 the court denied a target
corporation's motion for a preliminary injunction against the tender of-
feror on the ground that section 13(d) could not be invoked without
further acquisitions of the target's stock. In so holding, the court only
further muddled the standards of interpreting section 13(d). While
purportedly relying on GAF Corp., the Nicholson court nonetheless
used the additional acquisition test enumerated in Bath, Cox, and the
district court opinion in GAF, which was reversed on appeal. Citing
the language of GAF quoted aboye, the Nicholson court emphasized the
words "new aggregations" despite the express emphasis in the Second
Circuit's .GAF opinion on the words "potential changes"5 20 as the trig-
gering mechanism for section 13(d).
In addition to these judicial interpretations of what constitutes a "per-
son" required to file a Schedule 13D, two SEC rulings also provide
guidelines. In Budd Co.527 the SEC ruled that twelve lenders who re-
ceived warrants to purchase the common stock of Budd pursuant to
twelve separate, loan agreements would each have to file a Schedule
13D because their aggregate holdings amounted to fourteen percent of
523. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), rev'g in part 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
524. Id. at 718 (emphasis original). The Second Circuit did not resolve whether the
Milsteins had in fact violated § 13(d), nor, if they had, what relief would be appropriate.
Id. at 722. See Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. Sac. L. REP. 1 93,943 (D.NJ. 1973).
5,25. 341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972), affd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir.
1973).
526. See text accompanying note 524 supra.
527. 1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 78,115 (SEC 1971).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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Budd's outstanding stock. The SEC labeled these lenders a "group"
despite the allegations of the lenders that there had been no "pooling
of interests" or "concerted action" among them. This liberal interpre-
tation was followed in American Pepsi Cola Bottlers, Inc.5 28 The SEC
required Pepsi to file a Schedule 13D within ten days of acquiring more
than five percent of the outstanding stock in another corporation, al-
though Pepsi's holdings were reduced to less than five percent as the
result of a public offering by the second corporation eight days after
Pepsi's acquisition.
In determining what persons are covered by the Williams Act, it ap-
pears that both the SEC and the courts rely upon the Act's failure to de-
fine a "tender offer" in order to construe broadly the scope of the
Act.Y9 Instead of basing their rulings on the technical form of the
transaction, decision-makers look to the substantive effects of a
change in voting strength as a realistic gauge of corporate power.
Since individuals with voting control can adversely affect the interests
of public investors, they are required to put the public on notice, by
filing a Schedule 13D, that they are in a position to affect corporate
decisions as a result of the size of their share ownership.
B. Defining "Tender Offer"
In the absence of a statutory definition of "tender offer,"530 the SEC
and the courts have cautiously begun to define what does, and does
not, constitute a tender offer. Soon after the Williams Act went into
effect in July 1968, the SEC took the position that a "special bid," a
transaction involving a block of securities too large to handle on the
regular auction market system of the national securities exchanges, 531
would ordinarily be a tender offer subject to Williams Act regulation. 32
Judicial constructions soon followed. Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking
Co.5 3  held that a shareholder-approved exchange of securities pursu-
ant to a corporate reorganization was not a tender offer. The court
reasoned that the provisions of the Williams Act did not govern a trans-
528. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,765 (SEC 1972).
529. See note 478 supra.
530. Id.
531. See NYSE Rule 391, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 2391 (1971); American Stock
Exch. Rule 560.
532. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968).
533. 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971).
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action in which no "outsiders" were involved and no "contest" for con-
trol occurred.
In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,5 34 an individual, who had
unsuccessfully attempted to merge Cattlemen's with a company he con-
trolled, had soughta ruling from the SEC that the shares he had pur-
chased after negotiations (conducted through use of the mails, telephone
calls, and personal visits) with individual shareholders of Cattlemen's
did not constitute a tender offer. The SEC disagreed and defined a
tender offer in the following terms:
[A tender offer] is not limited to the classical "tender offer" where the
person desiring to acquire shares makes a public invitation or written
offer to the shareholders to tender their shares. Nor is there a require-
ment that shares be tendered through a depository. The change in con-
trol may be effected by direct purchase from shareholders without a
public or a written invitation for tenders having been made. Failure
to label the offers to purchase as "invitations for tender" is not determi-
native of the status of the transactions as a "tender offer" subject to sec-
tion 14(d). 535
Cattlemen's then brought suit for injunctive relief as a target corpora-
tion injured by the offeror's failure to register his acquisitions.530 The
district court agreed with the SEC and held that widespread solicitation
removed the purchases from the realm of private offers. 37 The court
534. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stipulation, Civil No. 72-
152 (W.D. Okla., May 8, 1972).
535. Cattlemen's Inv. Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rm,.
78,775, at 81, 627 (SEC 1972).
536. Cattlemen's complaint asked for three remedies:
(1) judgment that Fears violated section 14(d);
(2) preliminary injunction enjoining further acquisitions in Cattlemen's and
the voting of shares already owned during the pendency of the action; and
(3) injunction enjoining additional acquisitions of Cattlemen shares by
Fears for a five year period as well as the exercise of voting rights for shares
already owned for a like period of time.
343 F. Supp. at 1250.
537. The court reasoned as follows:
The activities of the defendant set out in the complaint and not denied by
the defendant, i.e. an active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders
in person, over the telephone and through the mails, contain potential dangers
which Section 14[d] of the statute is intended to alleviate. The defendant, in
not complying with the statute, deprived shareholders of information prescribed
by the Rule, which information was material to their investment decisions, and
denied to them the fair treatment provided by other parts of Section 14[d].
In truth, the contacts utilized by the defendant seem even more designed than
a general newspaper advertisement, the more conventional type of "tender
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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characterized the Williams Act as a "remedial statute," 538 and granted
a temporary injunction pending a trial on the merits.53 9
In response to a request for a ruling, the SEC, in Henry Heide,
Inc.,54 determined that section 14(d) did not govern a proposed invi-
tation for tenders of debentures of an issuer who was neither an insur-
ance company nor required to register under section 12(g). 541 The
Commission ruled that section 14(d) was inapplicable because
"[tihese debentures are not equity securities and they do not appear
to be convertible into equity securities," but it added that the anti-
fraud strictures codified in section 14(e)5 42 would nonetheless be en-
forceable. 43
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.544
limited the definition of a tender offer by excluding from the ambit
of section 14(d) ordinary securities purchased on the open market even
though the purchaser intended to gain control of the issuer. The district
court in Gulf & Western refused to require a filing of a Schedule 13D
when open market purchases are not made in the context of a tender
offer: "It appears to this Court that the 5 percent limit included in Sec-
tion 14(d) permits that amount to be purchased in the open market
without regard to any subsequent tender offer."5 45
Thus, in defining a tender offer two approaches appear to be evolv-
ing. The SEC looks to changes in voting control of equity interests.
The courts, on the other hand, examine facts evidencing the combatant
offer," to force a shareholder into making a hurried investment decision with-
out access to information, in circumvention of the statutory purpose.
Id. at 1251-52.
538. Id. at 1251.
539. Soon afterwards the parties vacated the suit per stipulation. Civil No. 72-152
(W.D. Okla., May 8, 1972).
540. 11972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RPu'. 1 78,838 (SEC 1972).
541. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970). No registration under section 12(g) was
needed because the issuer's common stock was held by only 25 people. [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,838, at 81,836.
542. See notes 493-95 supra and accompanying text.
543. 11972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE t. 78,838, at 81,834.
544. 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), a'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
545. Id. at 1074; accord, Wilfred P. Cohen Foundation, Inc. v. Prevor, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Water & Wall As-
sociates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 93,943 (D.N.J. 1973). However, the district court in Gulf & Western
went on to enjoin temporarily the consummation of the purchase of those shares in fact
governed by the tender offer regulations, and in its affirmation the Second Circuit lim-
ited its ruling to disclosure violations resulting from the actual tender offer.
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nature of corporate takeovers to determine if the transaction is, in fact,
a tender offer. The SEC is satisfied when there is a change in control;
the courts are demanding that such a change result from "outsiders"
seeking to push "insiders" out.
C. Standing
Section 14(e)5 46 is the basic statutory antifraud provision affecting
tender offers, regardless of the type of security involved or whether
the tender offer is subject to section 14(d) requirements.5 4  Al-
though it was patterned after the language of sections 10(b) and 14(a)
of the 1934 Act, section 14(e) was designed to reach all facets of a
tender offer. This is in contrast to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 which
are subject to the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation 48 and section
14(a) which is restricted to proxy solicitations containing materially
misleading representations.5 49  As have its models, however, section
14(e) has been construed to provide an implied private right of ac-
tion,550 although the courts rarely have given the issue the detailed con-
sideration found in the 10b-5 and section 14(a) cases. 51  Problems
have arisen, however, in section 14(e) cases in determining what party
may properly use the federally created rights and remedies. Given the
nature of a tender offer, the parties who would appear to have standing
are the target and its tendering and non-tendering shareholders, as well
as the tender offeror and its shareholders. The case law in this area
is gradually recognizing the standing of these parties to sue for section
14(e) violations.
546. See source cited note 493 supra.
547. See notes 540-43 supra and accompanying text.
548. See note 492 supra.
549. No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light
of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to
correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicita-
tion of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false
or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1974).
550. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969); H.K. Porter, Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), a! 'd
on other grounds, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
551. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'g 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.5 52 was the
first case to deal with standing under section 14(e). When Electronic
Speciality Co. (ELS) refused to merge with International Controls
Corp. (ICC), ICC made a tender offer to ELS shareholders. ELS and
a non-tendering shareholder responded by seeking an injunction
against the merger's consummation on the ground that ICC had made
allegedly misleading statements concerning its intention to make the
tender offer. 5 3 The district court granted standing to ELS, the target
corporation, by developing an analogy to the standing requirements
that had evolved for contesting proxy solicitations under section 14
(a),5 4 and granted standing to the non-tendering shareholder as a
member of the class protected by section 14(e).-55  The Second Cir-
cuit, focusing on the purpose of the Williams Act to elicit full disclosure
by both the target and the tender offeror for the protection of inves-
tors,""' affirmed. Thus, the appellate court interpreted the need for
protection by both a target and a non-tendering shareholder in the same
light:
While a nontenderer suffers no immediate injury from inadequacy of
price in the sense that he retains his stock, such inadequacy is likely
to have a depressing effect on the market for some time and thus may
hurt him if, for one reason or another, he should find it necessary or
desirable to sell. Such depression may also harm the target corporation
if it should wish to engage in financing or acquisitions, and a still differ-
ent potential for harm to the corporation will exist where it is claimed
that the offeror has evil designs on its treasury or business plans. The
rights of the nontendering stockholder and the corporation thus seem
sufficiently independent to give standing to both under all the provisions
added to § 14.557
552. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), a!f'g in part 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
553. The main argument of the complaint filed by ELS was that in its tender in-
vitation ICC had made false statements about merger plans once the tender offer was
completed. 295 F. Supp. at 1066-67. For a detailed statement of the facts, see
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 296 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (denying plaintiff's motion to enjoin consummation of tender offer on condition
that trial proceed at same court term; condition met four days later). See also notes
574-79 infra and accompanying text.
554. 295 F. Supp. at 1069-71, citing .. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
555. Id. at 1072. See Lowenschuss v. Kane, Civil Nos. 74-2156, 74-2216 (2d Cir.,
filed May 27, 1975); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 576 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
556. 409 F.2d at 945, citing H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968) (leg-
islative history of Williams Act).
557. Id. at 946; accord, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., [1969-
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In Neumann v. Electronic Specialty Co.,;58 a second case arising from
the same ICC-ELS tender offer, plaintiffs, non-tendering shareholders
of ELS, sought damages from the target for fraudulently discouraging
them from tendering their shares to ICC. ELS moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation",
applied to private actions under section 14(e). In denying ELS's mo-
tion, the Neuman court held that
if the difference in the language of 10b-5 and 14(e) is relied upon to
insist that lOb-5 may be invoked only by a plaintiff who consummates
an actual purchase or sale while 14(e) relates specially to tender offers
and protecting stockholders apart from any purchase and sale, then
though the instant lOb-5 claim would have to be dismissed, the claim
under 14(e) would nevertheless stand.5 60
In Fabrikant v. Jacobellis61 a non-tendering shareholder was held
to have standing to maintain a derivative action for damages on behalf
of the target corporation against a tender offeror. The Fabrikant court
stated that the standing criteria under the Williams Act were intended
to be less restrictive than those under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5:
Under 14(e) one may, in the language of the section, qualify for its
protection, by showing merely that the manipulative practices were "in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation."58 2
The court in Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co." 3 granted standing
to a shareholder of a tender offeror under section 14(e), following the
investor protection concept articulated in Electronic Specialty:
Unlike Section 10(b), Section 14(e) contains no hint of a purchaser-
seller requirement . . . Although this Court is aware of no case in
which standing was granted under Section 14(e) to one in plaintiff's
position, a determination that she has standing is both logical and com-
patible with the purpose of the statute.5 64
1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEc. L. RP. 92,471 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Butler
Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), af!'d, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
558. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,591 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
559. See note 492 supra.
560. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Snc. L. REP. 92,591, at 98,705.
561. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEC. L. REP'. 1 92,686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
562. Id. at 99,018.
563. 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971).
564. Id. at 914.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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The class protected by section 14(e) was further expanded when
standing was granted to defeated tender offerors in H.K. Porter, Inc.
v. Nicholson File Co. 65 and Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp.50 6 In Porter, plaintiff alleged that false and misleading
statements by the management of Nicholson, the target, to its share-
holders resulted in only a small percentage of Nicholson's stock being
tendered. Nicholson sought to invoke the rule 10b-5 purchaser-seller
requirement for standing0 7 and additionally argued that no express or
implied right of action existed for a tender offeror seeking damages
from a target. The court disagreed and, after citing the portion of the
legislative history relied on by the court in Electronic Specialty, con-
cluded:
The expenses to which a tender offeror corporation is put in making
its tender offer, only to have that offer defeated by fraud or misrepre-
sentations by the target corporation, is of obvious concern to the offeror's
shareholders. In some respects plaintiff here is acting to protect the
interests of its own shareholders.
. . . Congress did not intend to favor either the offeror or the target
corporation by passage of the Williams Act. 58
With these precedents to guide it, the Second Circuit, in Chris-
Craft,5 19 extensively analyzed the standing requirements for a tender
offeror under section 14(e). The court outlined four elements that
give rise to standing. First, the court reasoned that by deleting the
purchaser-seller language found in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, Con-
gress clearly intended to broaden the class of potential plaintiffs under
section 14(e). Secondly, the court relied on common law tort prin-
ciples, characterizing the loss incurred to Chris Craft Industries (CCI)
as
interference with a "prospective advantage", such as the opportunity to
purchase property, [giving] rise to a cause of action in the person in-
565. 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), a!f'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973). For dis-
cussion of a connected case arising out of the same tender offer, see source cited note
525 supra and accompanying text.
566. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). See generally 51 TEXAs L. REv. 1444 (1973).
567. See note 492 supra. This was the same argument that was unsuccessfully as-
serted in Neumann v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD.
SEC. L. REP. 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See text accompanying notes 558-60 supra.
568. 353 F. Supp. at 164.
569. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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jured where the means of interference adopted alone is unlawful, even
though the purpose in itself may be justifiable. . .. CCI therefore
probably could state a claim for relief in most state courts against each
of the defendants for tortious interference. 70
Thirdly, the court stated that since standing had been recognized in tar-
gets, tender offerors should be afforded similar protection as a matter
of equity. Finally, the court felt that the clear implication of earlier
decisions necessitated the extension of standing rights under section
14(e) to defeated tender offerors, for their financial stake in the out-
come is easily equal to that of target corporations.
Washburn v. Madison Square Garden Corp.5 71 is the only case to
date that expressly discusses a denial of standing under section
14(e). Plaintiff initiated suit on the basis of shareholdings in a corpo-
ration whose wholly-owned subsidiary had substantial holdings in a
third corporation, the target of a tender offer. When the parent corpo-
ration expended large sums to drive up the target's market price, the
shareholder alleged that she was injured by the costs of successfully
defeating the tender offer. In dismissing the shareholder's section
14(e) claim, the Washburn court ruled that her position in relation to
the target was too attenuated to warrant a finding that she had stand-
ing:
[The shareholder] was not the target of any tender offer or solicitation,
nor is there any specification of false or misleading statements in the al-
leged tender offer made to Roosevelt shareholders. Plaintiff, of course,
has no standing to represent the Roosevelt shareholders, and therefore
has no standing to sue under 14(e) in this action.572
Thus, in defining standing criteria for the enforcement of rights
protected under the Williams Act, the courts have been guided by the
interpretations given to the two other 1934 Act sections designed to
promote investor protection. This reliance has resulted in the incorpo-
ration of the doctrine that there is an implied private right of action
arising under a federally created statute, as well as an overall purpose of
investor protection. This doctrine has led courts to grant standing to
persons vulnerable to immediate economic injury as a result of a tender
offer, namely, target corporations and their tendering and non-
570. Id. at 360, citing W. PROSSER & Y. SMrH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
1131-52 (1967).
571. 340 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
572. Id. at 509.
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tendering shareholders, and tender offerors and their sharehold-
ers. The articulated criteria are based on a clear economic analysis
of the nature of tender offers; thus the courts have effectuated Con-
gress' stated purpose of closing a "gap?' in federal securities regula-
tion.573
D. Disclosure Violations
Item 4 of Schedule 13D, which requires disclosure of the "purpose
of transaction, '' 574 has been the major point of contention in the cases
interpreting the disclosure standards under section 14(e). The first
appellate-level interpretation of this requirement was in Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.Y ELS sought to en-
join • 1T ICC, a successful tender offeror, from voting the acquired stock
and thus alleged, inter alia, that ICC failed to disclose that it had "a fixed
and definite plan to merge the target and the offeror on a so-called
'share-for-share' basis."5 77  The Second Circuit disagreed; in holding
573. See note 492 supra. See generally Comment, Tender Offers: An Analysis of
the Early Development of Standing to Sue Under Section 14(e), 5 TEXAs TECH. L. REV.
779 (1974); Comment, Tender Offers: The Liberalization of Standing Requirements
Under Section 14(e), 7 U. SAN FRANcIScO L. REV. 561 (1973).
574. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974):
Item 4. Purpose of transaction
State the purpose or purposes of the purchase or proposed purchase of securi-
ties of the issuer. If the purpose or one of the purposes of the purchase or
proposed purchase is to acquire control of the business of the issuer, describe
any plans or proposals which the purchasers may have to liquidate the issuer,
to sell its assets or to merge it with any other persons, or to make any other
major change in its business or corporate structure, including, if the issuer is
a registered close-end investment company, any plans or proposals to make any
changes in its investment policy for which a vote would be required by section
13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-13).
575. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), affg in part 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also notes 552-57 supra and accompanying text.
576. Generally, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show
irreparable harm and the likelihood that he will prevail on the merits. See e.g., Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4768 (June 17, 1975); Lowenschuss v. Kane, Civil
Nos. 74-2156, 74-2216 (2d Cir., filed May 27, 1975); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Well-
ington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,096 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Commonwealth Ol Refining Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,081 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp.,
386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
577. The Company (ICC) intends through this Offer to acquire control of Spe-
cialty. It does not presently have any plans or proposals to liquidate Specialty,
to sell its assets or merge it with any persons (other than the Company or its
subsidiaries), or to make any other change in its business or corporate struc-
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that ICC had satisfactorily informed investors of the possibility of mer-
ger, the court noted: "It would be as serious an infringement of these
regulations to overstate the definiteness of the plans as to understate
them." 178 The court outlined the relevant considerations in determin-
ing the adequacy of disclosure and the standards of materiality as fol-
lows:
The likeness of tender offers to proxy contests is not limited to the issue
of standing. They are alike in the fundamental feature that they gener-
ally are contests. This means that the participants on both sides act,
not "in the peace of a quiet chamber" . . . but under the stresses of
the market place. They act quickly, sometimes impulsively, often in
angry response to what they consider, whether rightly or wrongly, to be
low blows by the other side. Probably there will no more be a perfect
tender offer than a perfect trial. Congress intended to assure basic hon-
esty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic requirement of labo-
ratory conditions that might make the new statute a potent tool for in-
cumbent management to protect its own interests against the desires and
welfare of the stockholders. These considerations bear on the kind of
judgment to be applied in testing conduct-of both sides-and also on
the issue of materiality. As to this we reaffirm the test announced in
Symington Wayne [Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843
(2d Cir. 1967)], whether "any of the stockholders who tendered their
shares would probably not have tendered their shares" if the alleged vio-
lations had not occurred. 57 9
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp.50 the target
successfully enjoined a tender offer before its consummation on the
basis of information disclosed in Item 3 of Schedule 13D filed pur-
suant to section 14(d).581 Item 3 reveals the "source and amount of
ture, except that it intends to continue Specialty's stated plans to sell its Space
Conditioning Division and will consider the possible liquidation or sale of any
other unprofitable divisions. Upon completion of this Offer the Company will
give consideration to a merger between itself or a subsidiary and Specialty.
295 F. Supp. at 1079-80, quoting ICC tender offer advertisement, Wall Street J., Aug.
19, 1968, at 15.
578. 409 F.2d at 948.
579. Id. Symington Wayne is a pre-Williams Act tender offer case illustrating the
problems of reliance on rule 10b-5 for tender offer regulation. General Time Corp.
v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), also cited by the Electronic Spe-
cialty court, held, inter alia, that an omission in a proxy statement concerning the hold-
ings of a challenger to incumbent management did not constitute a section 14(a) viola-
tion. Defendant corporation had engaged in a proxy fight in an attempt to acquire or
merge with the plaintiff corporation.
580. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L REP. [ 92,471 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
581. See notes 497-98 supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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funds" used to finance the tender offer; in this case, the information
suggested antitrust and Regulation T and G violations.s 2  The court in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, however, refused to require the tenderor, who
had stated an intention to obtain working control of the target, to reveal
how it would obtain control even though it did not know who would
provide the financing, since such "disclosure" would only be specula-
tion.583
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co.84 interpreted the
purpose disclosure provisions of Item 4 of Schedule 13D in a manner
similar to that propounded by the Second Circuit in Electronic Spe-
cialty on essentially the same facts.5s5 The court in Susquehanna held
that the tenderor's statement that it hoped to acquire working control
of the target and to run it as a subsidiary was adequate. The plaintiff
asserted that the tenderor's failure to state that it planned to vote its
holdings to elect a majority of the directors at the next shareholder's
meeting constituted a violation of section 14(e). Disagreeing, the
court reasoned that no further statement was required because control
can generally be assumed to be exercised by the board of directors.
Moreover, the court ruled that Susquehanna's statement in its Schedule
13D that it might ultimately seek a merger if its tender offer succeeded
582. These allegations were made in the course of two hearings, reported at 303 F.
Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,471 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
583. 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
584. 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
585. Susquehanna's amended answer to Item 4 of Schedule 13D read as follows:
Pan American had 4,751,342 shares of common stock issued and outstanding
as of October 31, 1968. Susquehanna through its offer intends to purchase
1,800,000 shares at $40 per share, which, if acquired, should in the opinion
of Susquehanna's Management, give Susquehanna working control of Pan
American. If control is achieved, it is contemplated that the business of Pan
American will be conducted as a subsidiary of Susquehanna serving as its nat-
ural resources arm.
Susquehanna does not plan or propose to liquidate Pan American, to sell its
assets to, or merge it with, any other person, or to make any other major
change in its business or corporate structure. However, if, at some subsequent
time, it should appear the interests of the Pan American stockholders would
be better served by any of the foregoing courses of action, Susquehanna may
propose or adopt such course.
Susquehanna does not intend to purchase any shares of Pan American other
than pursuant to this Offer during the period of this Offer, or any extension
thereof. However, at any time after the expiration of this Offer, or any exten-
sion thereof, Susquehanna reserves the right to purchase shares of Pan Ameri-
can over the New York Stock Exchange, or otherwise.
Id. at 1082.
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was sufficient disclosure,5 80 thereby avoiding a holding that would re-
quire a tender offeror to "walk a tortuous path" so long as it was "care-
ful not to delineate extravagantly or to enlarge beyond reasonable
bounds.
'587
In Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.,5 88 the Second Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against
Gulf & Western's consummation of its tender offer. In holding that
Gulf & Western's tender invitation had omitted material information in
violation of section 14(e), 589 the court stated that the test to be applied
was whether the information omitted was "of such significance that the
tendering shareholders would have weighed [it] in their decision
whether or not to sell."590  The court admitted evidence of Gulf &
Western's prior business practices vis-a-vis its acquisitions. This evi-
dence was used to determine whether Gulf & Western's failure to state
that it intended to participate actively in A & P's management was a
material omission.591
The Second Circuit had a further opportunity to refine section 14(e)
disclosure standards in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp.592 At the end of a bitterly contested tender offer, CCI, the of-
586. It should be obvious to even the uninitiated that when a corporation takes
over control of another corporation having $60,000 in cash assets, some kind
of change in the latter's business or corporate structure will likely occur some
time in the future. Susquehanna provided for this possibility by that portion
of its Item 4 response above quoted.
Id. at 1085.
587. Id. The court cited Judge Friendly's opinion in Electronic Specialty, discussed
in the text accompanying notes 574-79 supra, with approval and went on to state:
Though the offeror has an obligation fairly to disclose its plans in the event
of a takeover, it is not required to make predictions of future behavior, how-
ever tentatively phrased, which may cause the offeree or the public investor
to rely on them unjustifiably.
Id. at 1085-86.
588. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), affg 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
589. The allegedly material information omitted was statements about:
(1) G&W's intention to acquire a controlling position in A&P or at least
to exercise influence over A&P's management and policies; and
(2) G&W's holdings in other companies which indicate that G&W's acquisi-
tion of A&P stock is likely to result in violations of the antitrust laws by both
companies.
Id. at 695.
590. Id. at 696. See Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesolo Petroleum Corp.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEM. L. RP. 1 95,081 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in-
formation that reasonable investor might consider important).
591. Id. at 696-97.
592. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/4
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feror, was left in a minority position after an expenditure of $44 mil-
lion. As a defensive tactic against CCrs takeover bid, 593 Piper's man-
agement had helped arrange and actively supported a competing tender
invitation by Bangor Punta Corporation (BPC). In a suit brought by
CCI for damages and an injunction against the voting of stock acquired
by the two offerors, 594 the district court had held that both scienter and
causation must be proved to sustain an allegation of section 14(e) vio-
lations. Additionally, the district court refused to hold the underwriter
liable for its client's misconduct, absent fraudulent conduct of its own.
In reversing both holdings, the Second Circuit awarded damages to
CCI"P 5 and enjoined BPC from voting its holdings in Piper for five
years. The opinion meticulously analyzed the appropriate standards
for assessing section 14(e) violations. Expressly following the fraud
standards that had evolved under rule 10b-5, the Chris-Craft court
held that
a violation of § 14(e) is shown when there has been a material mis-
statement or omission concerned with a tender offer and when such mis-
statement or omission was sufficiently culpable to justify granting relief
to the injured party. The key concepts in this formulation are material-
ity and culpability.596
Echoing the language in its decision in Gulf & Western, the court con-
tinued:
The concept of materiality focuses on the weightiness of the misstated
593. For a discussion of the merits of alternative defense tactics, see ARANow & EiN-
HORN 219-76; Bradshaw, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in
Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104 (1969); Hayes & Taussig, supra note
479; Kelly, Some Observations on Contested Take-Over Bids, 15 N.Y.L.F. 619 (1969);
Kennedy, Defensive Take-Over Procedures Since the Williams Act, 19 CATH. U.L. REV.
158 (1969); Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25
Bus. LAw. 1441 (1970); Schmults & Kelly, supra note 484.
594. This complex litigation began in 1969 when CCI's motion for a preliminary in-
junction against BPC was denied at both the district and circuit court levels. See Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub
nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en
banc). The Second Circuit, however, remanded the case for further proceedings on de-
fendant's alleged securities laws violations, leading to the decision on which this appeal
was based. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1973), revlg 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
595. The basic formula used to measure damages was the reduction in the appraisal
value of CCI's holdings in Piper because CCI now only held a minority interest due
to BPC's fraudulent conduct. 480 F.2d at 380.
596. Id. at 362 (emphasis original; footnote omitted).
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or omitted fact in a reasonable investor's decision to buy or sell ...
As for the concept of culpability, intent to defraud is not an indis-
pensable element in a private action under Rule lOb-5; knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth may be sufficient.50 7
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court's requirement
that both scienter and causation be established:
In sum, and put as simply as possible, the standard for determining
liability under § 14(e) on the part of a person making a misleading
tender offer, or a responsible officer of a corporation making such an
offer, is whether plaintiff has established that defendant either (1) knew
the material facts that were misstated or omitted, or (2) failed or re-
fused to ascertain such facts when they were available to him or could
have been discovered by him with reasonable effort.598
The materiality and culpability criteria articulated in Chris-Craft
have been applied in subsequent opinions. First, in General Host
Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc.5"' a target's request for a preliminary
injunction to restrain further solicitation of shares and consummation
of a tender offer was granted. The court held that the foreign tender
offeror's failures to state both its intentions concerning liquidation of
the target's assets after the tender offer was completed and the appli-
cability of foreign government controls were sufficient omissions to war-
rant injunctive relief. Also, the court in Cauble v. White00 found
that both sides had violated sections 14(d) and (e), under the stand-
ards established in Chris-Craft, when the offeror failed to disclose its
intention to remove the target's president and the target misrepre-
sented the potential value of the stock of the company. The court or-
dered the parties to begin their respective takeover attempts and
defenses anew.
The facts in Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft"-, involved
a highly publicized attempted takeover of Ronson by a foreign
corporation. Ronson had been granted a preliminary injunction based
597. Id. at 362-63.
598. Id. at 364. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 55 (D.N.J. 1974)
(inadvertant failure to file schedule 13D alone and without intent to violate law or con-
ceal important facts does not authorize injunctive relief).
599. 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
600. 360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973).
601. 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.NJ.), affd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
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on Liquifin's failure to disclose adequately the tenderor's identity, the
methods used to fund the offer, the effect of foreign laws on the offer,
and the federal administrative problems involved.6 °2 In denying Ron-
son's motion for a permanent injunction, the court held that Liquifin's
substantial amendments to its Schedule 13D satisfied section 14(e) re-
quirements. The court cited Chris-Craft with approval and did not at-
tempt further definition of the materiality and culpability standards ap-
plicable to section 14(e).
Thus, in establishing disclosure standards for compliance with the
Williams Act, the courts apply the materiality and culpability standards
that originated in interpretations of rule lOb-5 and were further devel-
oped to gauge proxy solicitation violations under section 14(a). It ap-
pears sufficient that an omitted or misstated fact merely has a pro-
pensity to affect investor decisions, an easier burden of proof for an
injured party to meet than scienter and actual causation. In establish-
ing these standards the courts, as in the case of standing criteria, view
the Williams Act as affording greater investor protection by closing a
"gap" in federal securities regulation. 61 3
E. Conclusion
A tender invitation constitutes notice that there is an attempt to ef-
fectuate a corporate takeover. If the incumbent management agrees
that the tender offer is in the target corporation's best interests, the
tender offer mechanisms of the Williams Act map out the progression
for a successful takeover. 604 When the incumbent management op-
poses the plan of a tender offeror, the disclosure requirements of the
Williams Act are invoked by alleging fraudulent conduct violative of
the securities laws. 0 5 Thus, all litigation pleading Williams Act viola-
tions essentially concerns the materiality of disclosures for a particular
transaction, subject to the limitation that a tender offer has, in fact, been
made. 606 Within the context of the federal securities laws, the target
companies generally challenge the adequacy of the disclosure of the
purpose of a tender offer607 and its financing.60 8 Due to the complexi-
602. 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973).
603. See note 492 supra.
604. See D. AusTiN & J. FIsHMN, supra note 479. See also notes 496-98 supra.
605. See notes 493-98 supra and accompanying text.
606. See notes 530-45 supra and accompanying text.
607. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'g 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Susque-
hanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970); Electronic Spe-
Vol. 1974:815] 939
Washington University Open Scholarship
940 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:815
ties of today's business arrangements, non-securities law issues are also
argued when appropriate in a particular factual context.609
In an increasingly multinational business world, and in view of the
annual rise in the number of tender offers made by other domestic and
foreign persons,6 10 the regulation of tender offers should be regularly
reviewed for possible revisions to accommodate emergent business reali-
ties. The Williams Act itself was initially a response to a then-unregu-
lated business trend;"1" as the world of business takeovers becomes more
sophisticated, Congress is constantly challenged to maintain its much-
vaunted goals of investor protection and confidence in the nation's secu-
rities markets.
cialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), alfg in part
295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.,
356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
608. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'g 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Ronson
Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), af!'d 497 F.2d 394 (3d
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc.
v. Transamerica Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. % 92,471
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
609. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (antitrust violations). When al-
leging that antitrust violations would result if a particular tender offer were consum-
mated, such a violation must be premised on very clear antitrust principles. See Mis-
souri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), rev'g 375 F. Supp.
249 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (alleged Clayton Act violations due to proposed merger between
cement manufacturer and grain trader deemed too speculative to warrant injunctive re-
lief); General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), aff'd 497 F.2d
394 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974) (effect of foreign law).
610. See Wall Street J., Sept. 10, 1974, at 3, col. 3.
611. See note 492 supra.
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